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A Perspective from Within the White Coat
R. Dobbin Chow, M.D.*
I do solemnly swear by that which I hold most sacred that I will be loyal to the
profession of medicine and just and generous to its members. I will lead my
life and practice my art in uprighteousness and honor, ... it shall be for the
good of the sick, to the utmost of my power, I holding myself alooffrom wrong,
from corruption, from the tempting of others...'
-Oath of Hippocrates
One can easily generate a noisy and angry discussion in any physicians'
dining room in the United States by bringing up the subject of managed
care systems and their use of financial incentives to control physicians'
behavior. Generally, the reaction will range from a palpable frustration
among the younger physicians to a feeling of resignation in the senior
colleagues. The latter group will then reflect back on the era before
managed care, when compensation was on a per diem basis. The more vocal
younger generation will continue to vent their spleens about the illogical
and unfair nature of their compensation systems, and then realize that
they must quickly return to their respective offices, less their productivity
be undermined.
Having entered clinical practice during the adolescence of managed
care, I can provide one clinician's perspective, but cannot pretend to speak
for all physicians. There are many of my colleagues who have taken to
arms, securing M.B.A. degrees and reviewing HMO contracts every evening
before bed. It is easy to discern who these people are: They talk about
covered lives, contractual withholds, and capitation systems. I am not
among their number. Naive as it is to say, I chose to enter medicine to take
care of patients, and I assumed that I would be compensated fairly and live
comfortably. If indeed, I had wanted to maximize my future income, I
would have sought my fortune in the business world, or failing that, the
legal profession.
* R. Dobbin Chow is the Director of the Division of General Internal Medicine at Sinai
Hospital of Baltimore. He is also an Assistant Professor of Medicine at Johns Hopkins
University School of Medicine.
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I am a general internist, a physician for adults, spending most of my
time in the office setting seeing scheduled patients. Approximately 40% of
the patients for whom I provide primary care are insured by managed care
programs. An equal fraction are insured through Medicare, Medicaid, or
commercial insurance. Finally, a significant, but small proportion have no
insurance at all. The managed care patients belong to one of perhaps a
dozen different plans with which I am enrolled, each with their own panels
of specialists, drug formularies, laboratories for blood tests, and radiology
facilities. The managed care administrators monitor my prescribing habits,
compliance with recommended health maintenance measures (e.g.,
provision of influenza vaccines or screening mammography on
appropriate patients), rates of hospitalization, and utilization of emergency
room visits. They review data from pharmacies, office charts, and charges
from hospitals and emergency departments. They prefer that I prescribe
generic medications and keep patients out of hospitals and emergency
rooms. They generate utilization reports on an annual basis, comparing my
practice patterns to national averages.
I like to believe that I treat all patients the same, regardless of their
insurance. However, there are very practical economic dilemmas that I face
on a daily basis. For patients who do not have a prescription plan, generic
medications are almost mandatory. A common example is the new class of
arthritis drugs, which have the same effectiveness as the older ones, but do
not have the potential side effect of causing stomach ulcers. However, the
newer drugs cost $3.00 a pill, whereas the older generic arthritis
medications, such as ibuprofen, cost pennies a pill. HMOs allow me to
prescribe the newer medications, but only after obtaining formal approval
from their medical directors. Needless to say, this is a tedious and time-
consuming process. Similarly, authorization must be obtained for
subspecialty consultations outside of the primary HMO referral base. In
general, the HMO medical directors are loath to approve such requests,
claiming that similar care can be rendered within their plans. One
example might be acute leukemia, a cancer that is optimally treated at
special centers such as Johns Hopkins Hospital. However, the HMO may
wish to restrict care to their local hospital, which can certainly treat the
leukemia, but perhaps without the experience that Hopkins would
provide. However, the HMO may have a pre-arranged contractual
arrangement such that the local hospital takes care of all the HMO
enrollees for a flat fee.
The unflagging responsibility of a primary care physician is that of the
patient's advocate. Indeed, that is part of Hippocrates' Oath. My goal is to
provide quality care within whatever practical constraints exist for each
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individual patient. Such constraints might be lack of a prescription plan,
dependence on public transportation, or presence of a language barrier.
For each of these respective scenarios, I might offer sample medications
provided by pharmaceutical companies, complete applications for bus
passes for seniors, and provide language translation lines. Patients often
need our assistance in extracting from their insurer what is rightfully
theirs, such as medical equipment, access to home visiting nurses, or
ambulance transportation. On the other hand, limiting referrals,
laboratory testing, or consultations are important ways for HMOs to
control costs. If the patient's HMO becomes an obstacle to provision of
what I perceive to be optimal care, then I must try to petition the medical
director to allow an exception. If the HMO administrator chooses to deny
payment for the more effective but higher cost radiology study or
medication, then the HMO should be liable for any adverse outcome
related to that decision. For example, if the HMO declines to pay for the
aforementioned new arthritis medication, and the patient develops a
gastric ulcer on the traditional arthritis medication, then the fault lies with
the HMO. However, if I neglected to request authorization for the new
arthritis medication, then the fault lies with me. In general, the HMO fully
realizes this position, and will allow higher cost expenses when necessary.
However, the effort spent on the application, and the time delay of days to
weeks in securing approval, can be frustrating. Offices with at least three
general internists usually have at least one administrative staff member
dedicated entirely to managing referrals.
What limits the expense and breadth of my treatment for each patient?
In general, there is an accepted standard of care for most clinical
situations. This prevents physicians from ordering MRI scans of the head
for every patient with a headache, or CAT scans of the abdomen for each
patient with "stomach" pain. Physicians also have a responsibility to society
to limit utilization of medical resources and practice in a cost-effective
fashion. However, that responsibility is distinct from any responsibility
physicians may have to the HMO to reduce costs. The HMO may well have
a fiduciary responsibility to its shareholders to maintain profit and reduce
costs, but in the optimal situation, its health care providers should feel
beholden only to the well-being of the patients in the plan.
Any incentive that compromises the physician's role as the patient's
advocate creates an untenable position. Contractual arrangements with
HMOs are complex and varied, but many have incentives that attempt to
influence physician behavior. According to a survey of California
physicians in 1996, 38% reported having financial incentives in the form of
a bonus, yielding a median of 7% (or approximately $10,500) of net
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practice income.2 It is entirely reasonable to provide financial incentives to
reward those physicians who work harder for the betterment of their
patients. Examples of acceptable incentive programs are those tied to
patient satisfaction results or productivity parameters. Measurement of
quality of care is a controversial and inexact science, and all medical
systems find inherent difficulties in developing an ideal incentive system.
Clearly, incentive programs that seek to improve the financial status of
the HMO may, at times, directly conflict with patients' well-being. For
example, consider a physician who has 10% of his salary withheld each
year, but is eligible to receive the lump sum at the end of the year if he
meets certain targets in terms of hospital and emergency room costs. This
physician may feel conflicted at the end of the year if he is on the verge of
qualifying for his "withhold," and is evaluating ill patients who might
otherwise benefit from hospitalization or emergency room visits. If the
physician errs on the side of not hospitalizing ill patients, and an adverse
event occurs, then who is at fault?
The Pegram decision holds that the physician alone is liable. Most
clinicians do not agree with this decision, but that may be related to their
dissatisfaction with managed care in general. I hope the focus and
attention that Pegram brings to this issue will make physicians reconsider
their contractual relationships with their respective managed care systems.
I believe clinicians will want to avoid such adverse financial incentives
based on ethical standards alone, and seek alternatives that reward hard
work and quality of care. If physicians decline to participate with those
managed care programs that utilize financial disincentives, such programs
will have fewer providers from which patients may choose. Programs with
limited panels of physicians will be less desirable to potential patients. If
such incentive programs continue to exist, the Pegram decision will
reinforce the responsibility of physicians to provide high quality care,
irrespective of the impact of the cost of that care on the physicians'
reimbursement.
Although ill-received by physicians, the Pegram decision should not
significantly alter the practice of medicine. If the Peg-am decision ruled
that the HMO was liable, this would become a cloak behind which poor
medical decisions are substantiated. I hope that little will change in the
day-to-day practice of medicine as a result of this decision; that clinicians
will continue to treat in their patients' best interests rather than in their
own. As long as there are concerns about the cost of health care, efforts
will continue to control costs. Physicians must individually and in unison
guard against these efforts if patient care isjeopardized as a result.
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